I have been aware of this trend for some time, but the conversations I have at the bar of the Officer's Club with men and women I consider my friends are not fodder for my politics. When they speak to me frankly and off the record, that is exactly how I treat it. I may mention in passing what someone said, but conversations I have with officers, especially when they are still active duty, are sacrosanct. I am honored that they will speak openly with me and tell me what they really feel, and I will never betray that trust. I will, however, say that I have been aware for the better part of a year of a pervasive undercurrent among officers above the rank of Captain of the opinion that we are doing more harm than good, that the presence of our troops is what is gumming up the works. Now they are saying so on the record, although mostly anonymously.
"Deadlines could help ensure that the Iraqi leaders recognize the imperative of coming to grips with the tough decisions they've got to make for there to be progress in the political arena," said a senior Army officer who has served in Iraq. He asked that his name not be used because he did not want to publicly disagree with the stated policy of the president.Many officers who have been charged with executing the duties that come with mounting a counterinsurgency share the opinion that the U.S. troop presence is giving the fledgling Iraqi government cover, and that failure by the Iraqi government to move forward on key political and security measures has left senior military leaders frustrated.
Still, the administration cleaves to the notion that setting deadlines will just embolden the insurgents. Once the U.S. sets a withdrawal date, the argument goes, the Sunni-led guerrillas know exactly how long they must hang on before American troops are gone. They also argue that drawdown dates would allow Sunni-led militias to foment unrest that could undermine any political advances the government might manage to achieve.
Many military officials are wary of the consequesnces of timelines, but increasingly the officers who have faced the task at hand say they are looking more and more attractive. This opinion shift is a sign that gridlock in the Iraqi government is seen as a greater threat to achieving stability in Iraq than the insurgency itself. Without government reform, the Iraqi security forces are unlikely to ever be strong enough to take on the insurgency or the sectarian militias.
Retired Major General John Batiste, former commander of a division in Iraq and outspoken critic of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, has said that setting a date for a drawdown of combat brigades must be considered. Before the deadline, Batiste said, the U.S. also needs to step up its effort to advise and train the Iraqi military and police. "Holding the Iraqi government accountable is important, and that has everything to do with setting expectations and timelines," Batiste said. "It also has everything to do with doing all we can to ensure they are capable of completing the task they are trying to do."
"It's basic counterinsurgency," said a military officer who has served in Baghdad and did not want to publicly disagree with the president's stated policy. "You have to have a trusted, capable government."
That capable and trusted government does not exist. The train of reality is rolling down the tracks, and the stalled car of denial is about to get creamed.
